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THE MORALITY OF HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT:
A RESPONSE TO JOHN FINNIS*
MICHAEL J. PERRY"*
The final source for Christian ethical insight is [con-
temporary experience] .... I am referring primarily to the
testimony of women and men whose sexual preference is
for others of the same sex. Here, too, we have as yet no
univocal voice putting to rest all of our questions regarding
the status of same-sex relations. We do, however, have
some clear and profound testimonies to the life-enhancing
possibilities of same-sex relations and the integrating pos-
sibilities of sexual activity within these relations. We have
the witness that homosexuality can be a way of embodying
responsible human love and sustaining Christian friend-
ship. Without grounds in scripture, tradition, or any other
source of human knowledge for an absolute prohibition of
same-sex relations, this witness alone is enough to demand
of the Christian community that it reflect anew on the
norms for homosexual love.'
In his essay, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation ", John Fin-
* © 1994, Michael J. Perry.'
** Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law, Northwestern University.' I am
grateful to Tom Shaffer and John Robinson of the Notre Dame Law School for
inviting me to present this paper at Notre Dame on Nov. 10, 1994. I am
grateful, too, to Richard McCormick, SJ. of the Notre Dame Theology
Department and Paul Weithman of the Notre Dame Philosophy Department
for their illuminating discussion of the issues on the occasion of my visit to
Notre Dame. Finally, I am grateful to many friends and colleagues-at
Northwestern, Notre Dame, and elsewhere-for helpful comments.
After I had finished work on this paper, the following article, with which
this paper has an affinity, was published: Andrew Sullivan, Alone Again,
Naturally: The Catholic Church and the Homosexual, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 1994,
at 47. Mr. Sullivan, himself both Catholic and gay, is the editor of the NEw
REPUBLIC.
1. Margaret A. Farley, R.S.M., An Ethic for Same-Sex Relations, in A
CHALLENGE TO LovE: GAY AND LESBIAN CATHOLICS IN THE CHURCH 93, 99-100
(Robert Nugent ed., 1983). (Professor Farley, a member of the Sisters of
Mercy, is Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian Ethics at the Yale University
Divinity School; she is also a past president of the Society of Christian Ethics.)
Cf. JOHN MAHONEY, S.J., THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY- A STUDY OF THE
RoMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION 171 (1987) (arguing "there is also . . . the
authority of Christian experience, for which there can be no substitute").
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nis, the Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford, argues
that homosexual conduct between consenting adults is always
morally wrong or bad.2 (At one point Finnis uses the word
"evil".') He argues that such conduct is invariably morally bad-
i.e., it is morally bad without regard to any particularities of con-
text--"even :for anyone unfortunate enough to have innate or
quasi-innate homosexual inclinations."4 (By homosexual con-
duct, Finnis means "bodily acts, on the body of a person of the
same sex, which are engaged in with a view to securing orgasmic
sexual satisfaction for one or more of the parties."').
What is Finnis' argument-and is it sound?
I.
Let me begin by identifying four matters that are not in dis-
pute between Finnis and me.
First, it is not in dispute that "it is unjust for A to impose any
kind of disadvantage on B simply because A believes (perhaps
correctly) that B has sexual inclinations (which he may or may
not act on) towards persons of the same sex."6 Finnis agrees that
it is unjust for A to discriminate against B "based merely on A's
belief that B is sexually attracted to persons of the same sex."7 To
discriminate against a person on the basis of "a psychological or
psychosomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards homo-
sexual activity" is, in Finnis' view, "unjust."8
2. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NoTRE DAME
L. Rxv. 1049 (1994) [hereinafter Finnis, L. Rxv.], reprinted in 9 NoTRE DAmEJ.L.,
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11 (1995) [hereinafter Finnis,J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y].
3. Finnis, L. P, v., supra note 2, at 1055; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 16.
4. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1052; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 14.
5. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1055; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v,
supra note 2, at 17.
6. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1051; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v,
supra note 2, at 13.
7. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1054; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 15.
8. Finnis, L. Rxv., supra note 2, at 1053-54; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 15-16. Finnis opposes laws against such discrimination
on the ground that such laws are sometimes interpreted by courts and
always interpreted by "gay rights" movements as going far beyond
discrimination based merely on A's belief that B is sexually attracted to
persons of the same sex. Instead (it is observed), "gay rights"
movements interpret the phrase ["no discrimination based on sexual
orientation"] as extending full legal protection to public activities
intended specifically to promote, procure and facilitate homosexual
conduct.
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. Second, it is not in dispute that homosexual conduct
between consenting adults, like heterosexual conduct between
consenting adults, can be morally bad, in the sense of unworthy
of one who would be truly, fully human. For example, such con-
ductmay be manipulative, exploitative, unfaithful, or compul-
sive. In my view, any sexual conduct between consenting adults is
morally deficient to the extent it is unloving-i.e., to the extent it
is not animated by a concern for the wellbeing of the other
(whatever else it may be animated by); to the extent it is unlov-
ing, any sexual conduct, heterosexual or homosexual, is less wor-
thy than it should be of one who would be truly, fully human.9
Third, it is not in dispute that, even assuming arguendo that
homosexual conduct between consenting adults is always morally
bad, it exceeds the legitimate authority of the state to criminalize
such conduct (at least, if the conduct takes place in private). Fin-
nis accepts-and, indeed, in his essay defends-"a conception of
the proper role of government [that] exclude[s] the state from
assuming a directly parental disciplinary role in relation to con-
senting adults."'"
Fourth, it is not in dispute that even if the state cannot legiti-
mately criminalize some particular conduct, it may nonetheless
be the case that the state can legitimately judge the conduct to be
immoral and, on the basis of thatjudgment, try to discourage the
conduct or to protect others from it. I agree with Finnis that we
should distinguish
between (a) supervising the truly private conduct of adults
and (b) supervising the public realm or environment....
While the type (a) supervision of truly private adult con-
sensual conduct is now considered to be outside the state's
normally proper role (with exceptions such as sado-maso-
chistic bodily damage, and assistance in suicide), type (b)
supervision of the moral-cultural-educational environment
is maintained as a very important part of the state's justifi-
cation for claiming legitimately the loyalty of decent
Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1054; Finnis, J.L. ETmIcs & PUB. POL'Y, supra
note 2, at 15-16. SeeFinnis, L. REV., supranote 2, at 1053-55; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 15-16.
9. See Farley, supra note 1, at 105 (quoted later; see infra note 39).
10. Finnis, L. Rxv., supra note 2,at 1052; Finnis,J.L. ETmIcs & PUB. POL'Y;
supra note 2, at 14. Of course, to agree with Finnis that it exceeds the legitimate
authority of the state to criminalize homosexual conduct (assuming arguendo
such conduct is morally bad) is not necessarily to accept Finnis' rationale for
that position. For Finnis' rationale, see Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1070-76;
Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 33-39.
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citizens."
What is in dispute between Finnis and me is simply whether
homosexual conduct between consenting adults is, as Finnis
claims it is, always morally bad. If such conduct is not invariably
morally bad, then, with respect to "the public realm or environ-
ment", the state should not try to discourage the conduct or to
protect others from it on the theory that the conduct is invariably mor-
ally bad. To do so would be for the state to proceed on the basis
of a mistaken or false theory or judgment.
II.
Before turning to Finnis' argument, we should pause to
notice what Finnis contends about his argument: that it is "reflec-
tive, critical, publicly intelligible, and rational".' 2 In addressing
the question "What is wrong with homosexual conduct?", Finnis
denies that "the judgment that it is morally wrong [is] inevitably a
manifestation either of mere hostility to a hated minority, or of
purely religious, theological, and sectarian belief.""3 In an effort
11. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1053; Finnis,J.L. ETmics & PuB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 14-15. See Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1053; Finnis, J.L
ErHics & PuB. PoL'v, supra note 2, at 14-15:
The importance of [(b)] includes the following considerations: (1)
this is the environment or public realm in which young people (of
whatever sexual inclination) are educated; (2) it is the context in
which and by which everyone with responsibility for the well being of
young people is helped or hindered in assisting them to avoid bad
forms of life; and (3) it is the milieu in which and by which all citizens
are encouraged and helped, or discouraged and undermined, in their
own resistance to being lured by temptation into falling away from
their own aspirations to be people of integrated good character, and
to be autonomous, self-controlled persons rather than slaves to
impulse and sensual gratification. Id.
12. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1055; Finnis,J.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 16.
13. In denying that "the judgment that homosexual conduct is morally
wrong is inevitably a manifestation . . . of mere hostility to a hated minority,"
Finnis is responding to views like Richard Posner's. See RicHARD POSNER, SEX
AND REASON 346 (1992) (emphasis added):
[S] tatutes which criminalize homosexual behavior express an irrational
fear and loathing of a group that has been subjected to discrimination, much
like that directed against the Jews, with whom indeed homosexuals-who, like
Jews, are despised more for who they are than for what they do--were frequently
bracketed in medieval persecutions. The statutes thus have a quality of
invidiousness missing from statutes prohibiting abortion or
contraception. The position of the homosexual is difficult at best,
even in a tolerant society, which our society is not quite; and it is made
worse, though probably not much worse, by statutes that condemn the
homosexual's characteristic methods of sexual expression as vile
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to show that his argument is not a narrowly Christian argument,
much less a narrowly Catholic argument, much less a narrowly
Thomist argument, Finnis examines at length the views of some
of the classical Greek philosophers, including Socrates, Plato,
and Aristotle, all of whom, according to Finnis, "reject[ed] all
homosexual conduct." 4 "All three of the greatest Greek philoso-
phers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, regarded homosexual con-
duct as intrinsically shameful, immoral, and indeed depraved or
depraving."15
It is precisely because Finnis' argument aims to be "reflec-
tive, critical, publicly intelligible, and rational"-and because
Finnis is himself a sophisticated moral philosopher (a natural
lawyer) 6 -that his argument deserves serious examination. If
Finnis cannot construct a sound nonreligious argument in sup-
port of the position he wants to defend, there is reason to doubt
crimes.... There is a gratuitousness, an egregiousness, a cruelty, and
a meanness about [such statutes].
Id.
About "purely religious, theological, and sectarian belief" Finnis says:
"[Such] belief can ground no constitutionally valid determination disadvantag-
ing those who do not conform to it". Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1055;
Finnis,J.L. EmIcs & PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 17. It is not the case that such
belief can never ground a constitutionally valid determination disadvantaging
those who do not conform to the belief. The matter is more complicated than
Finnis' comment here suggests. See Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and
Human Rights, DOCmINE & LIn, (forthcoming Jan. 1995).
14. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1062; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 25.
15. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1055; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 17. See also Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1055-63; Finnis, J.L.
ETHi'cs & PUB. POL'V, supra note 2, at 16-25. Finnis also claims that "Immanuel
Kant... likewise rejected all homosexual conduct...." Finnis, L. REv., supra
note 2, at 1063; Finnis,J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y, supra note 2, at 25.
Much of Finnis essay is an argument, principally with Martha Nussbaum,
University Professor and Professor of Philosophy, Classics, and Comparative
Literature at Brown University, about what the classical philosophers did or did
not say about the morality of homosexual conduct. See also Gerard V. Bradley,
In the Case of Martha Nussbaum, FIRST THINs, June/July 1994, at 11. The reader
interested in pursuing that aspect of Finnis' essay should consult Martha C.
Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to
Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REv. 1515 (1994). Appendix 4 to
Nussbaum's essay is co-authored by Nussbaum and Kenneth J. Dover.
Appendix 4 begins: "Because we believe it is very important to counter
erroneous accounts of ancient Greek homosexuality, and because Professor
Finnis' citation of Dover as if he supports Finnis' position has made public
clarification of Dover's position urgent, we jointly state our position below." Id.
at 1641. (Both Finnis and Nussbaum presented their essays at the University of
Notre Dame in 1994-though not on the same occasion.)
16. SeeJOHN M. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
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that such an argument exists.'
7
III.
Let's now examine Finnis' argument that homosexual con-
duct between consenting adults is always morally bad. Finnis'
essay is twenty-eight pages long, but his argument about homo-
sexual conduct consists of just eight pages: Finnis develops his
argument over the course of thirteen paragraphs, beginning with
the last paragraph on page 1062 of his essay (which I shall call
"Paragraph 1") and finishing with the first full paragraph on
page 1070 ("Paragraph 13"). I shall comment on his argument
as it emerges, paragraph by paragraph. My focus is on what Fin-
nis says about the morality of homosexual conduct, not on what
Finnis says other writers say about the morality of such
conduct.18
Paragraph 1
Finnis begins, in Paragraph 1, by stating "three fundamental
theses" that, he says, are "[a]t the heart of the Platonic-Aristote-
lian and later ancient philosophical rejections of all homosexual
conduct". The first two theses are, as we'll see, the crucial ones.
(1) The commitment of a man and a woman to each other
in the sexual union of marriage is intrinsically good and
reasonable, and is incompatible with sexual relations
outside marriage. (2) Homosexual acts are radically and
peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason intrinsically
unreasonable and non-marital. (3) Furthermore, accord-
ing to Plato, if not Aristotle, homosexual acts have a special
similarity to solitary masturbation, and both types of radi-
cally non-marital acts are manifestly unworthy of the
17. Finnis states that his argument "is an application of the theory of
morality and natural law developed over the past thirty years by Germain Grisez
and others. A fuller exposition can be found in the chapter on marriage,
sexual acts, and family life, in the new second volume of Grisez's great work on
moral theology." Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1063; Finnis, J.L. ETHmicS &
PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 25. Finnis then cites, in footnote 35, to: "2 Germain
Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Living a Christian Life 555-574, 633-680
(1993)." Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1063 n.35; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 25 n.35. In the course of writing this commentary on
Finnis' essay, I have read the passages of Grisez's work cited by Finnis. (Grisez
was one of my teachers at Georgetown University in the mid 1960s-though
Grisez surely has no recollection of that fact.)
18. See supra note 15.
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human being and immoral.19
Thesis (1) consists of two claims. The first is that "the com-
mitment of a man and a woman to each other in the sexual
union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable". (I heart-
ily agree.) The second claim is that "the commitment of a man
and a woman to each other in the sexual union of marriage... is
incompatible with sexual relations outside marriage"-i.e.,
outside such a marriage, a heterosexual marriage. By "is incompati-
ble with sexual relations outside [heterosexual] marriage", Finnis
does not mean: "is incompatible with either the man or the
woman having sexual relations outside their marriage." (Thus
understood, the second claim would be quite irrelevant to the
question of the morality of homosexual conduct between two.
persons neither of whom is married to another and who may
even consider themselves bound to one another. in a lifelong,
monogamous relationship of faithful love.) Rather, Finnis
means: "is incompatible with anyone having sexual relations
outside the context of a heterosexual marriage." Thus under-
stood, the second claim is directed not specifically against homo-
sexual conduct, but against any sexual conduct, heterosexual as
well as homosexual, outside the context of a heterosexual mar-
riage. Thesis (2) presupposes thesis (1) as a major premise. If
"the [intrinsically good and reasonable] commitment of a man
and a woman to each other in the sexual union of marriage"
were incompatible with anyone having sexual relations outside
the context of a heterosexual marriage, then "[h]omosexual
acts", which are an instance of sexual relations outside the con-
text of a heterosexual marriage, would be incompatible with "the
[intrinsically good and reasonable] commitment of a man and
woman to each other in the sexual union of marriage."
.Paragraphs 2-3
In Paragraph 2, Finnis tells us that he "now want[s] to offer
an interpretation of the three theses which articulates them
more clearly than was ever attempted'by Plato or, so far as we can
tell, by Aristotle."
2 0
In Paragraph 3, Finiis writes: "Genital intercourse between
spouses enables them to actualize and experience (and in that
sense express) their marriage itself, as a single reality with two
blessings (children and mutual affection). Non-marital inter-
19. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1062-63; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 25.
20. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1063; Finnis, J.L. ETHIcs& PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 25.
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course, especially but not only homosexual, has no such point
and therefore is unacceptable." 21 Gertrude Stein said of Oak-
land: "There is no 'there' there." We may fairly wonder about
Finnis' statement ("Non-marital intercourse . . . therefore is
unacceptable") whether there is a "therefore" there. There may
be, instead; merely a non-sequitur. At the end of Paragraph 1 we
were left with this question: Why accept Finnis' claim that "the
[intrinsically good and reasonable] commitment of a man and a
woman to each other in the sexual union of marriage" is incom-
patible with anyone having sexual relations outside the context
of a heterosexual marriage? Now, at the end of Paragraph 3, we
are left with this question: Why accept Finnis' claim that in order
to be "acceptable," sexual intercourse between two persons must
enable them to "actualize and experience (and in that sense
express)" their relationship "as a single reality with two blessings
(children and mutual affection)"? The premise that seems to
connect Finnis' two claims is this: The commitment of two per-
sons to one another in a sexual union is "intrinsically good and
reasonable" only if sexual intercourse between them enables
them to "actualize and experience (and in that sense express)"
their union "as a single reality with two blessings (children and
mutual affection)." The general question we are left with at this
point in Finnis' essay, therefore, is: Why accept that premise?
Finnis is right that the relationship of a man and a woman in
marriage, a relationship that is partly sexual, is-or, at least, at its
best can be-"a single reality." Why insist that no other relation-
ship-i.e., no other relationship that is partly sexual-can be,
even at its best, a single reality? Why not believe, instead, that
any friendship, including one that is partly sexual, can constitute,
at its best, a single reality? If any friendship can be, at its best, a
single reality, then, depending on the nature of the friendship,
which may or may not be partly sexual, one or another act
(which, depending on the nature of the friendship, may or may
not be sexual) may "enable them to actualize and experience
(and in that sense express) their [friendship] itself, as a single
reality with [its one or more] blessings," whatever those blessings
may be (which depends on the nature of the friendship). Why
doubt that at its best, any sexual union between two adults,
whether heterosexual or homosexual-i.e., a sexual union that is
lifelong, monogamous, faithful, and deeply loving 2 2-can be a
21. Finnis, L. Rzv., supra note 2, at 1064; FinnisJ.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 26.
22. When I refer to "lifelong" sexual unions both here and elsewhere in
this essay, I am referring to sexual unions, whether heterosexual or




In Paragraph 4, Finnis writes: "[I]n sterile and fertile mar-
riages alike, the communion, companionship, societas and amid-
tia of the spouses-their being married-is the very good of
marriage, and is an intrinsic, basic human good, not merely
instrumental to any other good."23 He then refers to "this com-
munion of married life" as an "integral amalgamation of the lives
of two persons .... ,, 4 Finnis concludes the paragraph by stating,
approvingly,
the position that procreation and children are neither the
end (whether primary or secondary) to which marriage is
instrumental (as Augustine taught), nor instrumental to
the good of the spouses (as much secular and 'liberal
Christian' thought supposes), but rather: Parenthood and
children and family are the intrinsic fulfillment of a com-
munion which, because it is not merely instrumental, can
exist and fulfill the spouses even if procreation happens to
be impossible for them.25
Finnis fails to explain, in Paragraph 4, why it cannot be true
of any lifelong, monogamous, faithful, and loving friendship that
is (partly) sexual, whether it be between a man and a woman, a
man and a man, or a woman and a woman, that "the commu-
nion, companionship, societas and amicitia of the friends-their
being united in their friendship-is the very good of their friend-
ship, and is an intrinsic, basic human good, not merely instru-
mental to any other good." He does not explain why it cannot be
true of any lifelong, monogamous, faithful, loving friendship that
is partly sexual that "this communion of friendship" is an "inte-
gral amalgamation of the lives of two persons.
Let's now turn to Finnis' statement that "[p]arenthood and
children and family are the intrinsic fulfillment of a communion
which, because it is not merely instrumental, can exist and fulfill
the spouses even if procreation happens to be impossible for
them." No doubt parenthood and children and family are the
be lifelong, and in which they struggle with all the resources at their command
to bring that hope and intention to fulfillment.
23. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1064; Finnis,J.L. EiHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 27.
24. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1064-65; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 27.
25. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1065; Finnis,J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'v,
supra note 2, at 27.
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intrinsic fulfillment of a certain kind of communion-one in
which the spouses want to have children and raise a family, per-
haps even one in which the spouses have joined themselves
expressly (though not solely) for that purpose, perhaps because
they judge it to be (a part of) their vocation, their calling, to do
so. But obviously not every (heterosexual) marriage is a commu-
nion of that kind; not every marriage is one in which the spouses
want to have children; not every pair of spouses judge it to be
their vocation to raise a family. Finnis acknowledges that "a com-
munion .... because it is not merely instrumental, can exist and
fulfill the spouses even if procreation happens to be impossible
for them." He does not explain, in Paragraph 4, why a commu-
nion cannot exist and fulfill the spouses even if procreation is
something they have chosen to forgo. (Perhaps they have cho-
sen to forgo procreation for reasons of health-or perhaps
because they have chosen to devote their lives to a demanding
ministry that is realistically incompatible with their raising a fam-
ily of their own. There can be morally good reasons, after all, for
choosing to forgo procreation-reasons worthy of one who
would be truly, fully human-just as there can be morally bad
reasons. Even Finnis will allow that, for example, there can be
morally good reasons for choosing to forgo procreation and
instead become a celibate priest as well as morally bad reasons.)
Nor does he explain why a lifelong, monogamous, faithful, and
loving communion between a man and a man or a woman and a
woman-a communion that is partly sexual-cannot exist and
fulfill the partners even though procreation is in the nature of
things not available to them (which they may or may not regret,
depending on what they would choose if it were available to
them) .6
Paragraphs 5-6
In Paragraph 5, Finnis begins to get to the heart of the mat-
ter. He expressly recognizes and articulates the question he must
address (and, in subsequent paragraphs, proceeeds to address):
"Why cannot non-marital friendship be promoted and expressed
by sexual acts? Why is the attempt to express affection by orgas-
mic non-marital sex the pursuit of an illusion?" Why is it "that
26. I am ignoring, for present purposes, this complication: Many gay and
lesbian couples do raise families; sometimes they do so because they have freely
sought and happily embraced the opportunity to do so. Indeed, some gay and
lesbian couples raise children who were begotten to be raised by them. On the
subject of gay and lesbian parenting, see, e.g., Kimberly Lenz, We Are Family:
Gay and Lesbian Parents Face Challenges and Harbor Familiar Hopes-Growth as
Loving Committed, Open Families, CHI. PARENT, May 1994, at 21.
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homosexual conduct (and indeed all extra-marital sexual gratifica-
tion) is radically incapable of participating in, actualizing, the
common good of friendship"? 7
In Paragraph 6, Finnis commences his response:
[T] he common good of friends who are not and cannot be
married (for example, man and man, man and boy,
woman and woman) has nothing to do with their having
children by each other, and their reproductive organs can-
not make them a biological (and therefore personal) unit.
So their sexual acts together cannot do what they may
hope and imagine. Because their activation of one or even
of each of their reproductive organs cannot be an actualiz-
ing and experiencing of the marital good-as marital inter-
course (intercourse between spouses in a marital way) can,
even between spouses who happen to be sterile-it can do
no more than provide each partner with an individual grat-
ification. For want of a common good that could be actual-
ized and experienced by and in this bodily union, that
conduct involves the partners in treating their bodies as
instruments to be used in the service of their consciously
experiencing selves; their choice to engage in such con-
duct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting
persons.
2 8
The fundamental problem with the foregoing passage is that
Finnis falsely believes that even in the context of a homosexual
friendship that is a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful
love, homosexual conduct "can [never] do [any] more than pro-
vide each partner with an individual gratification." Homosexual
conduct, like heterosexual conduct, can do more-much
more-than provide each partner with "an individual gratifica-
tion." Interpersonal sexual conduct, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, can be a way of affirming and serving both the sex-
ual and the emotional wellbeing of one's lover; as such, sexual
conduct can both express, in a bodily (embodied) way, one's love
for one's lover; indeed, at its best such conduct can be a genera-
tive matrix of the emotional strength one needs to live well-to
live a truly, fully human life-and therefore to attend to one's
27. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1065-66; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 28.
28. Finnis, L. Rzv., supra note 2, at 1066-67; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 28-29. Finnis says, in the footnote attached to this
passage (footnote 47): "For the whole argument, see [Germain] Grisez, [2 The
Way of the LordJesus, Living a Christian Life (1993),] at 634-39, 648-54, 662-64."
See Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1065 n.47; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 29 n.47.
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most challenging responsibilities, such as those that attend being
a parent.29 Sexual conduct can be all this (and more) even if it is
not meant to be-indeed, even if it is meant not to be-procreative.
Note, moreover, that the (authentic) wellbeing of one's lover-
including both the sexual and the emotional wellbeing of one's
lover-is a common good, a good not only for one's lover but also
for oneself. This is so because what is (truly) good for one's lover
is also good for oneself, just as it is the case that what is good for
one's child, what is conducive to or even constitutive of one's
child's wellbeing, is also, because it is good for one's child, good for
oneself.
Finnis forthrightly acknowledges, in his essay, that his point
is not confined to homosexual conduct, but applies to heterosex-
ual conduct that is, in Finnis' words, "deliberately con-
tracepted." °  Finnis' position is (a) that "deliberately
contracepted" heterosexual conduct cannot, not even in the con-
text of a marriage, "do... more than provide each partner with
an individual gratification" and (b) that the "choice to engage in
such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting
persons." One who,, on the basis of his or her real-world experi-
ence-indeed, perhaps on the basis of his or her experience in
marriage-disagrees with Finnis' point as applied to "deliber-
ately contracepted" heterosexual conduct has good reason to be
skeptical that Finnis' point as applied to homosexual conduct has
any firmer grounding in real-world experience. There is an
(inappropriately) abstract quality to Finnis' argument: Finnis
seems to be arguing that it is a priori impossible that either homo-
sexual conduct or "deliberately contracepted" heterosexual con-
duct (even in the context of a marriage) can do more than
provide each partner with an individual gratification. What a
strange claim.
The human sexual appetite is both natural and basic. That a
homosexual sexual appetite is not natural for me does not entail
that it is not natural for anyone, and that the heterosexual sexual
appetite is natural for me does not entail that it is natural for
everyone.' In choosing to satisfy the human sexual appetite,
29. See Richard Westley, We Are Makers of Love, PRAYING, May-June 1994, at
28.
30. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1068 n.50; Finnis,J.L. EHics & Pun.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 31 n.50.
31. Consider here Thomas Aquinas's teaching on homosexual activity (in
coitu masculorum):
Now with regard to pleasures of either of these two kinds, there
are some .Which are unnatural, absolutely speaking, but may be called
natural from a particular point of view (sed connaturales secundum quid).
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one is not catering to or indulging a pathological or a manufac-
tured appetite the satisfaction of which is everywhere and always
antithetical to one's authentic flourishing as a human being.
Finnis does not elucidate why the choice of two persons to
engage in sexual conduct in mutual satisfaction of their sexual
appetite-in particular, the choice of two partners in a lifelong,
monogamous relationship of faithful love to engage in sexual
conduct in a way that affirms and serves the sexual and emo-
tional wellbeing of one another-is necessarily dis-integrative of
each of them "precisely as acting persons" just in virtue of the
For is sometimes happens that one of the principles that is natural to
the species as a whole has broken down in one of its individual
* members; the result can be that something which runs counter to the
nature of the species as a rule, happens to be in harmony with nature
for a particular individual (fieri per accidens naturaie huic individuo), as it
becomes natural for a vessel of water which has been heated to give
out heat. Thus something which is "against human nature," either as
regards reason or as regards physical preservation, may happen to be
in harmony with the natural needs of this man because in him nature
is ailing. He may be ailing physically: either from some particular
complaint, as fever-patients find sweet things bitter, and vice versa; or
from some dispositional disorder, as some find pleasure in eating
earth or coals. He may be ailing psychologically, as some men by
habituation come to take pleasure in cannibalism, or in copulation
with beasts or with their own sex (in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum), or
in things not in accord with human nature.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-2, 31-39, quoted in Gerald D. Coleman,
S.S., The Vatican Statement on Homosexuality, 48 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 727, 733
(1987).
What is the contemporary Thomist to conclude when he or she learns what
was unknown to Thomas (as well as, of course, to the biblical authors), namely,
that a homosexual sexual orientation is normally innate and not the yield of one or
another "psychological ailment" (which is not to deny that homosexuals, too-
especially homosexuals who have born the many terrible burdens of a culture
that is pervasively homophobic-may ail psychologically)? "Homosexuality is a
variation in human sexual orientation that occurs consistently, even though
with less frequency than heterosexuality." Coleman, supra, at 733-34. (Finnis
acknowledges the innateness of homosexual sexual orientation. See supra text
accompanying note 4.)
[O]fficial Catholic rejection of homosexual acts antedates by far knowl-
edge of homosexuality as a not-chosen and most often irreversible ori-
entation. That leads to the interesting and provocative question: does
this knowledge have no influence whatsoever on the assessment of homo-
sexual behavior (acts) at the objective level? One has to wonder if the
distinction between orientation and acts, acknowledged now by all
official documents and pastorals, has not remained abstract and unex-
amined in these documents with respect to its possible implications.
RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, SJ., REFLECTIONS ON MORAL DILEMMAS SINCE VATICAN
II 300 (1989). See infta text accompanying note 76 for John Noonan's state-
ment, about "new insight.")
1995]
54 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [VoL 9
fact that the particular sexual conduct they choose to engage in
is either nonprocreative or "deliberately contracepted." 2
We can better understand what drives Finnis' position if we
turn to a part of Paragraph 6 I've not yet quoted:
The union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife
really unites them biologically (and their biological reality
is part of, not merely an instrument of, their personal real-
ity); reproduction is one function and so, in respect of that
function, the spouses are indeed one reality, and their sex-
ual union therefore can actualize and allow them to experi-
ence their real common good-their marriage with the two
goods, parenthood and friendship, which (leaving aside
the order of grace) are the parts of its wholeness as an
intelligible common good even if, independently of what
the spouses will, their capacity for biological parenthood
will not be fulfilled by that act of genital union. 3
What drives Finnis' position is his view-which is also the view of
his mentor-collaborator, Germain Grisez 3a-that any sexual con-
duct between -two persons, even persons married to one another,
is morally illicit if it cannot. or does not "actualize" and "allow
them to experience" their relationship as, at least in part, a procre-
ative union (a would-be if not actual procreative union). Let me
put this Grisez-Finnis view into perspective for the reader by
quoting a remarkable passage from what Finnis describes as "the
new second volume of Grisez's great work on moral theology": 5
A married couple's sexual act is morally illicit "if either or both
spouses do anything inconsistent with their act's being of itself
suited to procreating (for example, if spouses unable to engage in
intercourse due to the husband's impotence masturbate each other to
orgasm, if a couple trying to prevent the transmission of disease use a
condom, or if either or both spouses do something in order to impede
32. Why is conduct morally bad simply because it involves one in treating
one's body "as an instrument to be used in the service of one's consciously
experiencing self"? Assume that from time to time I choose to eat a food that is
utterly without nutritional value (and so does me no physical good) but that is
otherwise harmless and satisfies my appetite for a particular taste or sensation.
Assume, too, that I do not thereby fail to eat, or make it more likely that
someday I will fail to eat, the nutritional foods I need. Have I thereby done
something that "dis-integrates me precisely as an acting person"? Cf FiNNIS,
supra note 16, at 87 (discussing "play" as "[t ] he third basic aspect of human well-
being").
33. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1066; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 28.
34. See supra note 28.
35. See supra note 17.
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conception) ."6
As I said, a remarkable passage. Not at all surprisingly, the
Grisez-Finnis view is controversial and indeed widely rejected
among Christians, even among Catholic Christians, few of whom
today deny-indeed, many, probably most, Catholic moral theo-
logians today affirm-that the sexual conduct of a husband and
a wife can be morally licit if it "actualizes" and "allows them to
experience" their marriage, not, or not any longer, or not yet, as a
procreative union (actual or would-be), but simply, or now sim-
ply, as a sexual-spiritual union (i.e., a sexually-rooted and sexu-
ally-embodied spiritual union) of profound depth and
richness.3 7 The nonprocreative sexual conduct of a man and a
woman in a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful love
can be morally licit if it "actualizes" and "allows them to experi-
ence" their friendship as a sexual-spiritual union of profound
depth and richness.3 8 Why, then, can't the sexual conduct of a
36. Grisez, supra note 17, at 636 (emphasis added).
37. See ic:HA-ju P. McBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 982-92 (rev. ed. 1994). Cf
Westley, supra note 29, at 32:
Love making, good mindful sexuality is a spiritual art. It is the most
difficult of the spiritual arts. Making love is a human enterprise, not a
blind biological urge. What makes it difficult is that it can be just a
blind biological urge. It takes discipline, commitment and hard work
to wring the good growth out of it that is possible. The spiritual art is
to take this biological thing and transform it into a growth toward
love, to bring forth the great potential.
Id.
38. In an effort to achieve "the most charitable reconstruction of Finnis'
argument", Paul Weithman states:
Finnis' argument against homosexuality... depends on [the] claim...
that human beings must never choose to act against the good realized
by the 'biological (hence personal) units' constituted by voluntary,
uncontracepted, heterosexual union.... [G]oods do seem worthy of
respect and Finnis' claim that it is unreasonable to choose against
them is plausible.
Weithman then adds that he believes that Finnis is wrong to conclude "that
homosexual unions cannot actualize common goods." Paul Weithman, A Propos
of Professor Periy: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual Ethics, 9 NoTRE DAMEJ. L., ETHICS
& PUB. POL'V 75, 79 (1995). No doubt, a (true) good is worthy of respect, and it
is at least presumptively unreasonable to choose against a good. But goods in
abstracto are not goods at all; they are intellectual constructions. Goods, if they
are goods at all, are concrete. And a concrete state of affairs, like "my conceiv-
ing a child" or "my getting pregnant", may be good for one or another person
but not good-even, perhaps, very bad-for one or another other person. It is not unrea-
sonable, even presumptively, for me to choose against a concrete state of affairs
that is not good for me. (Of course, if my choosing against a concrete state of
affairs that is not good for me involves my choosing against a concrete state of
affairs that is good for someone else-or even choosing for a concrete state of
affairs that is bad for someone else-the matter is more complicated. Choosing
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man and a man or of a woman and a woman also be morally
licit-why cannot it also be worthy of those who would be truly,
fully human-if it actualizes and allows them to experience their
friendship as a lifelong, monogamous, faithful, loving sexual-spir-
itual union of profound depth and richness?
The social and legal institutionalization of the position on
the morality of homosexual conduct for which Finnis contends
has not been conducive to the development of a moral culture in
which there would be more homosexual relationships that are
lifelong, monogamous relationships of faithful love. It would be
perverse, therefore, for one who applauds that institutionaliza-
tion to try to make hay of the fact that many homosexual rela-
tionships are not lifelong, monogamous, faithful, and loving. In
any event, the question before us is not how many homosexual
relationships are lifelong, monogamous relationships of faithful
love. Not all heterosexual relationships-not even all heterosex-
ual "marriages"-are such relationships. I don't know how many
homosexual relationships are lifelong, monogamous, faithful,
and loving, any more than I know how many heterosexual rela-
tionships are such relationships. The question is: Regardless of
how many or how few homosexual relationships are lifelong,
monogamous, faithful, and loving, is homosexual conduct in the
context of such a relationship always morally illicit?
Paragraph 7
In Paragraph 7, Finnis responds to one of the complaints I
have just made about Paragraph 6 (that there is an inappropri-
ately abstract quality to his argument). His response is to deny
the moral relevance of the sort of considerations-the sort of
particularities of context-that are widely agreed, by Christians
and others, to be not merely morally relevant, but morally
determinative:"
to have an abortion, for example, is much more problematic than choosing to
engage in contracepted sex.)
39. In a preliminary version of his comments on this paper, Paul
Weithman misread me. My claim here is not that "widely shared judgments" are
morally determinative; it is not that "the popularity of a view about human
sexuality... entaills] its truth." Weithman, supra note 38 (preliminary version
on file with author). What a conspicuously silly claim that would bet I quite
agree that 'popular judgments about human sexuality need always to be
checked against the best intellectual work on the subject." Id. at 86. My claim,
rather, is that various "particularities of context" (as I call them) are among the
things that are morally determinative. The sort of contextual particularities I
have in mind are just those that Margaret Farley obviously had in mind when
she wrote this passage:
My answer [to the question of what norms should govern same-sex
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Reality is known in judgment, not in emotion, and in real-
ity, whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts
of giving with which some same-sex partners may surround
their sexual acts, those acts cannot express or do more
than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in such
activity to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute
pleasures a client to give him pleasure in return for money,
or (say) a man masturbates to give himself pleasure and a
fantasy of more human relationships after a grueling day
on the assembly line.... [T] here is no important distinc-
tion in essential moral worthlessness between solitary mas-
turbation, being sodomized as a prostitute, and being
sodomized for the pleasure of it. Sexual acts cannot in real-
ity be self-giving unless they are acts by which a man and a
woman actualize and experience sexually the real giving of
themselves to each other-in biological, affective and voli-
tional union in mutual commitment, both open-ended and
exclusive-which like Plato and Aristotle and most peoples
we call marriage.40
The abstract quality of Finnis' argument against homosexual
conduct, and the falseness of the premises his argument com-
prises, are perhaps nowhere more evident than in the preceding
passage. One wonders what Finnis means by "reality" or "in real-
ity." As if the reality of sexual acts-the reality of what they
express and do-could possibly be determined without regard to
whether those acts are inspired by, animated by, "generous hopes
and dreams and thoughts of giving." It is (dare I say it) absurd,
relations and activities] has been: the norms of justice-the norms
which govern all human relationships and those which are particular
to the intimacy of sexual relations. Most generally, the norms are
respect for persons through respect for autonomy and rationality;
respect for relationality through requirements of mutuality, equality,
commitment, and fruitfulness. More specifically one might say things
like: sex between two persons of the same sex (just as two persons of
the opposite sex) should not be used in a way that exploits, objectifies,
or dominates; homosexual (like heterosexual) rape, violence, or any
harmful use of power against unwilling victims (or those incapacitated
by reason of age, etc.) is never justified; freedom, integrity, privacy are
values to be affirmed in every homosexual (as heterosexual)
relationship; all in all, individuals are not to be harmed, and the
common good is to be promoted. The Christian community will want
and need to add those norms of faithfulness, forgiveness, of patience
and hope, which are essential for any relationships between persons
within the Church.
Farley, supra note 1, at 105.
40. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1067; Finnis,J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 29-30.
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even perverse, to suggest that from a moral perspective the real-
ity of sexual conduct that takes place in and is expressive of a
lifelong, monogamous homosexual relationship of faithful
love-or the reality of "deliberately contracepted" sexual con-
duct that takes place in and is expressive of a lifelong, monoga-
mous heterosexual relationship of faithful love-is essentially the
same as the reality of the sexual conduct of "a prostitute pleasur-
ing a client in return for money." (According to Finnis, "there is
no important distinction in essential moral worthlessness" among
those different types of sexual conduct.) Responding to the
claim that "[h]omosexual acts, by definition and in principle,
sever the connection between sexuality and procreation," Father.
Thomas -H. Stahel, SJ., former executive editor of the Jesuit
weekly America and now assistant to the president of Georgetown
University, writes:
But if homosexual acts are human acts, their significance is
not restricted to their physical description or physical
effects. If homosexuality, as practiced by Christians, could
be shown to be procreative in some way that transcends the
biological, we might attempt to assign it a teleology fitted
to Christian morality. That is the crux. So it will not do to
reduce the significance of human sexuality, whether
straight or gay, to the physical act itself.41
Finnis writes that "[r]eality is known in judgment, not in
emotion." The judgment/emotion opposition is simplistic and
misleading. Sometimes an emotional response can impede one's
reaching a sound judgment; sometimes, however, an emotional
response not only precipitates the process of judgment, but also
clarifies or illuminates the way to a sound judgment.4 2 Let us
agree, in any event, that "[r]eality is known in judgment." It is
41. Thomas H. Stahel, S.J., Transcending Biology, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 11,
1994, at 2. Then, responding to the claim that "[f]or incarnational religion the
intrinsically nonprocreative nature homosexual acts is a metaphysical dead-
end," Father Stahel continues:
Well, then, what about the intrinsically nonprocreative nature of my
vowed chastity, my clerical celibacy? And as long as we are on the
subject of the Incarnation, what are we to say of Jesus Christ?-who
was born of a woman, all right, but not by a heterosexually procreative
act? When [Paul] Baumann pushes the incarnational argument
[against homosexuality] as he does, he only proves to me that we can
be fundamentalistic about almost anything, even so beautiful a truth
as the Incarnation.
Id.
42. Martha Nussbaum has suggested, in correspondence, that "one might
add that Finnis's contrast between judgment and emotion would not win the
approval of any ancient thinker; besides, it's bad philosophy." Letter from
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nonetheless true that the abstract "reality" that Finnis seems to
believe he knows a priori is far, removed from the reality that
many others believe they know a posterior on the basis of experi-
ence, whether their own experience or that of credible others
whom they trust. It is far removed from the experienced reality
that must inform our judgments about what conduct is, or is not,
worthy of those who would be fully, truly human. The reality
apprehended by many married couples who practice contracep-
tion, and by many homosexual couples, is directly contrary to the
reality postulated byJohn Finnis (and by Germain Grisez and the
religious-moral tradition Grisez re-presents).
Finnis is reduced to claiming that the reality apprehended
by many married couples who practice contraception and by
many homosexual couples, unlike the reality asserted by him, is
illusory. Finnis refers to the married couple's "illusions of inti-
macy and self-giving in" acts of deliberately contracepted sex. .43
According to Finnis, the many married couples who engage in
"deliberately contracepted" sex, including millions of Christian
married couples (many of whom are, like Finnis, Catholic Chris-
tians)," are, if they think they are not doing something morally
wrong, in the grip of an "illusion". In Finnis' view, no doubt, it is
an illusion aided and abetted for the Christian couples by all
those ministers and priests and theologians who do not submit to
the position Finnis defends. By contrast, Finnis is, confidently
and happily, in the grip of "reality"-which is known by him not
in "emotion", but in "judgment". Finnis may want to reflect on
the significance of the fact that only one-quarter of all American
Catholic priests accepts the Church's official teaching on contra-
ception-and only a little more than half of them (56%) accepts
the Church's 'position on homosexual conduct.4 5 Are all those
dissenting priests-many of whom who daily minister tO married
Martha Nussbaum to author. For a book-length elaboration, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DEsiRE (1994).
43. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1068; Finnis,J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 31.
44. See, e.g., James Brooke, With Church Preaching in Vain, Brazilians
Embrace Birth Contro/ N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at Al:
In a country where Catholics account for 75 percent of the nation's
154 million people, every relevant statistic shows that most people
ignore the Catholic Church's teachings on family planning methods.
In a survey of 2,076 Brazilian adults in June, 88 percent of respondents
said they "don't follow" church teachings on birth control.... Among
women from 25 to 44, the "don't follow" group expanded to 90
* percent.
45. See Andrew M. Greeley, A Sea of Paradoxes: Two Surveys of Priests,
AMERICA, July 16, 1994, at 6, 8.
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couples or to homosexual couples or to both-in the grip of an
"illusion", too?
The reader can decide for herself whose "reality" is an illu-
sion: that apprehended by the heterosexual couples who engage
in mutually affirming and nurturing but "deliberately con-
tracepted" sexual conduct in the context of their marriages, and
by the homosexual couples who engage in mutually affirming
and nurturing sexual conduct in the context of their lifelong,
monogamous relationships of faithful love-or, instead, that pos-
tulated byJohn Finnis, for whom "deliberately contracepted" sex
in marriage and homosexual sex in a lifelong, monogamous rela-
tionship of faithful love is equal in moral worthlessness to the com-
mercial sex of a prostitute with the prostitute's client. The
serious question, in my view, is not who is in the grip of an "illu-
sion" but why Finnis, unlike so many others, has not been able to
break the grip of the particular illusion that holds him, why he
has not been able to see through it.' According to the Grisez-
46. Paul Weithman writes: "If Perry recognizes the possibility that large
numbers of people were in the grip of a sexually conservative illusion (as
Russell and Lawrence alleged), then he must recognize the possibility that large
numbers of people are in the grip of a sexually liberal one (as Finnis alleges)."
Weithman, supra note 38, at 84. I do recognize the latter possibility. Indeed, I
more than recognize it: I believe that large numbers of people in our society
and elsewhere are in the grip of one or another "sexually liberal" illusion, at
least for some period of their lives-and some of them for their entire lives.
However, what particular illusion is it that deliberately contracepting married
couples-or lifelong, monogamous, faithful, loving homosexual couples-
might be in the grip of? I just don't discern the possible-i.e., the realistically
possible-illusion. (Does Weithman?) The issue doesn't seem to me a serious
one. See Sullivan, supra note **, at 55:
[T]o dismiss the possibility of a loving union for homosexuals at all-
to banish from the minds and hearts of countless gay men and women
the idea that they, too, can find solace and love in one another-is to
create the conditions for a human etiolation that no Christian
community can contemplate without remorse. What finally convinced
me of the wrongness of the Church's teachings was not that they were
intellectually so confused, but that in the circumstances of my own
life-and of the lives I discovered around me-they seemed so
destructive of the possibilities of human love and self-realization. By
crippling the potential for connection and growth, the Church's
teachings created a dynamic that in practice led not to virtue but to
pathology; by requiring the first lie in a human life, which would lead
to an entire battery of others, they contorted human beings into
caricatures of solitary eccentricity, frustrated bitterness, incapacitating
anxiety-and helped to perpetuate all the human wickedness and
cruelty and insensitivity that such lives inevitably carry in their wake.
These doctrines could not in practice do what they wanted to do: they
could not both affirm human dignity and deny human love.
Id. Cf. Lance Morrow, A Convel's Confession, TIME, Oct. 3, 1994, at 88: "Ameri-
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Finnis view of the matter, recall, a married couple's sexual act is
"in reality" morally worthless-no less so than is the commercial
sex of the prostitute-"if either or both spouses do anything
inconsistent with their act's being of itself suited to procreating
(for example, if spouses unable to engage in intercourse due to the hus-
band's impotence masturbate each other to orgasm, if a couple trying to
prevent the transmission of disease use a condom, or if either or both
spouses do something in order to impede conception)."'
Paragraphs 11-13
In Paragraphs 11-13,4" which constitute a separate section
(section VI) of Finnis' essay, Finnis makes two claims that he has
not made in the preceding ten paragraphs. First, he claims that
"[t]he deliberate genital coupling of persons of the same sex...
is sterile and disposes the participants to an abdication of respon-
sibility for the future of humankind."49 This is a silly claim. After
all, by itself the decision of a homosexual couple living in a life-
long, monogamous relationship of faithful love to engage in sex-
ual conduct with one another no more necessarily disposes them
"to an abdication of responsibility for the future of humankind"
than by itself their decision not to engage in sexual conduct with
one another necessarily disposes them to an acceptance of
responsibility for the future of humankind. Indeed, the sexual
conduct of a homosexual couple who are raising children," like
that of a "deliberately contracepting" heterosexual married
couple who are raising children, may well be-and at its best cer-
tainly is-a source of the kind of mutual emotional nurture that
helps them to raise the children in their charge with great love
and strength.5 '
Finnis' second claim, in Paragraphs 11-13, is that homosex-
ual conduct, even in the context of a lifelong, monogamous rela-
tionship of faithful love,
treats human sexual capacities in a way which is deeply hos-
tile to the self-understanding of those members of the
community who are willing to commit themselves to real
marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not
can Catholics-and millions elsewhere-understand that the church is simply
out to lunch on the subject of birth control." Id.
47. Grisez, supra note 17, at 636 (emphasis added).
48. Because Finnis does not introduce any new argumentative material in
Paragraphs 8-10, I have proceeded to Paragraphs 11-13.
49. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1069; Finnis,J.L. ETHmics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 31.
50. See supra note 26.
51. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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mere instruments or accompaniments to, or mere compen-
sations for, the accomplishment of marriage's responsibili-
ties, but rather enable the spouses to actualize and experience
their intelligent commitment to share in those responsibili-
ties, in that genuine self-giving. [It] treats human sexual
capacities in a way which is deeply hostile to the self-under-
standifig of those members of the community who are will-
ing to commit themselves to real marriage... .52
The problem with this claim (and with the related claim Fin-
nis makes in Paragraph 13) is Finnis' false belief that even in the
context of a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful love,
homosexual conduct "can do no more than provide each partner
with an individual gratification.""3 Finnis seems oblivious to the
fact that the mutually affirming and nurturing sexual love of two
homosexual partners for one another-tWo partners living a life-
long, monogamous relationship of faithful love-does not pre-
suppose (nor does it entail) that "sexual joys [in the context of
marriage] are mere instruments or accompaniments to, or mere
compensations for, the accomplishment of marriage's responsi-
bilities." The reason that the mutually affirming and nurturing
sexual love of two homosexual partners for one another does not
presuppose what Finnis imagines it to presuppose is that the part-
ners may well understand, based on their own lived experience,
that far from being "mere instruments or accompaniments to, or
mere compensations for, the accomplishment of [their relation-
ship's] responsibilities," their sexual joys "enable [them] to actual-
ize and experience their intelligent commitment to share in those
responsibilities, in that genuine self-giving. " 4
By now it should be very clear that the logic of Finnis' posi-
tion is such that, according to the position, "deliberately con-
tracepted" sexual conduct by a married couple, no less than
homosexual conduct, is "deeply hostile" to the self-understand-
ing to which Finnis refers. But such conduct can scarcely be
deeply hostile to the self-understanding of all those very many
married couples-including a very substantial majority (80%) of
Catholic couples of childbearing age in the United States"-
who regularly engage in what Finnis calls "deliberately con-
tracepted" sexual conduct. The reason that such conduct is not
52. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1069-70; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUn.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 32.
53. Finnis, L. REV., supra note 2, at 1066; FinnisJ.L. ETmcs & PUB. PoL'Y,
supra note 2, at 29.
54. Finnis, L. REV., supra note 2, at 1069-70; Finnis, J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 32.
55. See McBRIEN, supra note 37, at 983.
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hostile to their self-understanding is because, based on their own
lived experience, they understand, though Finnis'does not, that
"deliberately contracepted" sex can do much more "than provide
each partner with an individual gratification"-as can homosex-
ual conduct. If, contra Finnis, "deliberately contracepted" sex is
not "deeply hostile" to their self-understanding, why should
homosexual sex that takes place in, the context of a lifelong,
monogamous relationship of faithful love be deeply hostile to
their self-understanding? Compare, to Finnis' claim about the
deep hostility of homosexual conduct to the self-understanding
to which he refers, this comment by a Catholic "wife and mother"
(Joan Sexton) in her letter to the editor of Commonweal, the
American lay Catholic weekly:
[Here are some] thoughts about the argument that gay
marriage would endanger the institution of heterosexual
marriage....
[I] t seems to me, as wife and mother, that it may be the
most committed of hearts that would enter and stay in a
marriage as a one-to-one relationship. I admire the cour
age of the homosexual person giving him/her self to one
person, one body, one heart and to a lifelong struggle to
understand and support that other. It's a promise that
draws, from me, at least, respect and awe.
And I suspect that such marriages could teach us a lot
-in terms of realizing the ideal .of true friendship. It's inter-
esting that the challenge of:women on ordination has
brought forth a fresh new look at what priesthood means;
so the challenge of gay couples to be included in the insti-
tution of marriage promises a new look at what marriage
means.
56
Joan Sexton ,seems to have discerned something that has, so far,
eluded the grasp of John Finnis.
IV.
Recall that Finnis means his argument to be, at every turn,
"reflective, critical, publicly intelligible, and rational." (Finnis
denies, recall, that "the judgment that [homosexual conduct] is
[always] morally wrong [is] inevitably a manifestation. . . of purely
religious, theological, and sectarian belief.") I am willing to con-
cede that the argument Finnis presents is a nonreligious ("secu-
56. Joan Sexton, Learning from Gays, CoMMoNWEAL, June 17, 1994, at 28.
Sexton also wrote, in the opening of her letter, that "the list of threats to
modem Christian marriage is so long that gay marriage should rank about
twenty-fourth, even for those who take it seriously." Id.
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lar") argument, in the sense that the argument does not
presuppose theistic premises; nor does Finnis (or Grisez) present
the position for which he argues as the yield only of some episte-
mologically privileged insight, of some special ("graced") revela-
tion (e.g., the Bible understood as the word of God).
Finnis' nonreligious argument is not sound. It is not an
argument we should accept. Nor is it an argumerit that a person
logically can accept-even a person who wants to accept it, who
wants to believe that the position that homosexual conduct is
always wrong can be rationally vindicated-if that person rejects
Finnis's argument that "deliberately contracepted" sexual con-
duct is always morally bad: The Grisez-Finnis argument that
"deliberately contracepted" sexual conduct is always morally bad
and the Grisez-Finnis argument that homosexual conduct is
always morally bad are essentially the same argument. They are the
argument that any sexual conduct between two persons is always
morally illicit if it cannot or does not "actualize" and "allow them
to experience" their relationship as (at least in part) a procreative
union.5 7 One who rejects that argument but nonetheless wants
to believe that homosexual conduct is always morally wrong will
have to look elsewhere than to Finnis and Grisez for a sound
argument. I doubt they will find such an argument anywhere.5 8
Once sex is no longer confined to procreative genital acts
... , then it is no longer possible to argue that sex/love
between two persons of the same sex cannot be a valid
embrace of bodily selves expressing love. If sex/love is
centered primarily on communion between two persons
rather than on biologistic concepts of procreative comple-
mentarity, then the love of two persons of the same sex
need be no less than that of two persons of the opposite
57. Grisez's and Finnis' particular argument against homosexual
conduct, connected as it is to their argument against "deliberately
contracepted" sexual activity, is not idiosyncratic. That connection or linkage
represents an official position of the Catholic Church, which teaches that a
fundamental moral problem with all homosexual conduct is its nonprocreative
character. Cf. Michael J. Farrell, Feisty New Ireland Leaves the Church Panting to
Keep Up, NAT'L CATH. Rrm., July 29, 1994, at 7, 8 (quoting Archbishop
Desmond Connell of Dublin, Ireland: "If, under the influence of the
contraceptive culture, society accepts a view of marriage that releases the
married couple from all commitment to procreation, it opens the way to the
final debasement of marriage, the recognition of so-called homosexual
marriages."). On contemporary talk among Catholics about "the contraceptive
culture", see Helen Fitzgerald, Needed: More, Not Less Talk About Sexuality,
COMMONwEAL, Nov. 4, 1994, at 42.
58. Cf Nussbaum, supra note 15, at 1530 (commenting on "the secular
argument of Roger Scruton").
RESPONSE TO F!NNIS
sex. Nor need their experience of ecstatic bodily commu-
nion be less valuable.5 9
There remain, of course, various religious arguments against
homosexual conduct-for example, arguments based on the
Bible. Fundamentalist religious arguments of any kind, includ-
ing fundamentalist religious arguments against homosexual con-
duct,' are deeply problematic, even for those who count themselves
religious.6 1 To be sure, not every argument against homosexual
conduct based on the Bible-whether the Hebrew Bible, the
59. Rosemary Ruether, The Personalization of Sexuality, in FROM MACHISMO
TO MuTuALrrv: ESSAYS ON SEXISM AND WomAN-MAN LIBERATION 70, 83 (Eugene
Bianchi & Rosemary Ruether, eds., 1976).
Weithman writes: "Why not think that very different moral considerations
are relevant to the questions of whether to engage in orgasmic homosexual
activity and whether to engage in heterosexual sex in a way designed to prevent
conception?" Weithman, supra note 38, at 88. I think I understand the point
Weithman is trying to make, but I would put it differently. Imagine three
couples: (1) a heterosexual couple who are able to conceive and bear a child in
the normal way and who know that they have that ability; (2) a heterosexual
couple who are unable to conceive a child and who know that they have that
disability; and (3) a homosexual couple. Couple (1) faces a question that
simply does not arise for couple (2) or couple (3): Whether to engage in sex in
a way designed to prevent conception? Obviously the considerations that bear
on this question are different from the considerations that bear on the question
whether to engage in sex at all, which is a question that may arise for all three
couples. (Does Weithman mean to say more than this? In particular, does
Weithman mean to allow for the possibility of a plausible moral perspective
from which the following claim is defensible: "Even if orgasmic homosexual
sexual conduct is not always morally wrong, deliberately contracepted
heterosexual conduct is always morally wrong.")
60. See Brenda You, A Holy War Against Gays, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1994, § 5,
at 1.
61. See Thomas F. O'Meara, O.P., FUNDAMENTALISM: A CATmouc
PERSPECTIVE (1981). See also Eric Zom, Citing a Wrong to Block a Right, CI. Tpam.,
Apr. 21, 1994, § 2, at 1:
[T] he favorite biblical passage of those who rail against homosexuality
[is] Chapter 18, Verse 22 of Leviticus: "You shall not lie with a male, as
with a woman; it is an abomination.
Suffice it to say that this particular book-with its obsession with
animal sacrifice, expressions of disgust at the uncleanliness of
menstruating women, approval of the death penalty for blasphemers,
acceptance of human slavery, endorsement of torture, and vilification
of the disabled-is not otherwise considered a reliable legislative
guide in contemporary society.
The Bible's relevance in such debates is further clouded by [the
way in which] one can find in it justification for any number of
practices most of us frown on, including cannibalism (Deuteronomy
28), incest (Genesis 19), genocide (Numbers 31), self-mutilation
(Matthew 18), and the execution of Sabbath breakers (Exodus 31).
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New Testament, or both-is a fundamentalist argument. None-
theless, as an impressive growing literature in contemporary
Christian ethics argues, no biblically-based argument against
homosexual conduct fails to be deeply problematic even for
those who accept the authority of the Bible.62
V.
I want to conclude on a personal note, directed especially to
other Christians-most especially to those whose religious tradi-
tion is Catholic.
Finnis' argument about homosexual conduct is not a nar-
rowly Christian, much less a narrowly Catholic, argument.63 But
the position on the morality of homosexual conduct Finnis
defends, like the position on the morality of "deliberately con-
tracepted" sexual conduct he defends, is an "official" position of
the Catholic Church. (Indeed, as I said, one and the same argu-
ment supports both positions.) Finnis and I are both Catholic;
indeed, we are both Catholic parents who are raising our chil-
dren in our shared religious tradition. When my children are
older I will tell them why I believe the tradition is fundamentally
in error both in judging that contraception is always immoral
and in judging that homosexual conduct is always immoral. And
at some point I will introduce my children to John Noonan's
62. See, e.& McBRIEN, supra note 37, at 993-97; McCoRmicK, supra note 31;
Coleman, supra note 31; Jeffrey S. Siker, How to Decide?: Homosexual Christians,
the Bible, and Gentile Inclusion, THEOLOGY TODAY, July 1994, at 219.
63. Cf. Basil Mitchell, Should Law Be Christian? LAw & JUSniCE, No. 96/97
(1988), at 12, 21 (emphasis in original):
But, the objection may be pressed, can a religious body argue its
case in -a secular forum (i.e., one that is not already antecedently
committed to the religion in question)? Either, it may be said, it will
rely on Christian premises, which ex hypothesi opponents will not
accept; or it will employ purely secular premises, in which case the
ensuing law will not be Christian. In neither case will any genuine
debate have taken place between Christians and non-Christians. The
dichotomy, however, is altogether too neat to be convincing. It
presupposes that there is and always must be a complete discontinuity
between Christian and secular reasoning. Certainly this can occur-if,
for example, the Christian is an extreme fundamentalist and the
secular thinker regards individual preferences as the sole basis for
morality.... But,... Christians would presumably want to argue (at
least, many of them would) that the Christian revelation does not
require us to interpret the nature of man in ways for which there is
otherwise no warrant but rather affords a deeper understanding of
man as he essentially is. If that is so, there is room for a genuine
exchange of ideas.
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recent, seminal article in Theological Studies: "Development in
Moral Doctrine. " ' Discussing usury, marriage, slavery, and reli-
gious freedom, Noonan demonstrates:
Wide shifts in the teaching of moral duties, once presented
as part of Christian doctrine by the magisterium, have
occurred. In each case one can see the displacement of a
principle or principles that had been taken as dispositive-
in the case of usury, that a loan confers no right to profit;
in the case of marriage, that all marriages are indissoluble;
in the case of slavery, that war gives a right to enslave and
that ownership of a slave gives title to the slave's offspring;
in the case of religious liberty, that error has no rights and
that fidelity to the Christian faith may be physically
enforced.... In the course of this displacement of one set
of principles, what was forbidden became lawful (the cases
of usury and marriage); what was permissible became
unlawful (the case of slavery); and what was required
became forbidden (the persecution of heretics).65
64. SeeJohn T. Noonan,Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 662 (1993). See also Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N. Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1994, § 1,
at 8. (commenting on Judge Noonan's article). Steinfels describes Judge
Noonan, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as "ajurist
and scholar who defies familiar categories."
A summa cum laude graduate of Harvard at 19, he received a
Ph.D. in philosophy from the Catholic University of America in 1951
before returning to Harvard for his law degree in 1954 and eventually
a teaching post at Harvard Law. [Noonan also taught at the law
schools of Notre Dame and of the University of California at Berkeley.]
In the 1960s he published an authoritative history of the Church's
opposition to contraception, a book widely used to support the case
for changing that position. In the 1970s he opposed the Supreme
Court's ruling that upheld women's right to have abortions, and
campaigned for a constitutional amendment to protect the unborn.
Liberals brooded when President Ronald Reagan appointed him
to the Federal bench in 1985. But as a judge, he has angered
conservatives with his outspoken declarations on behalf of death row
inmates seeking stays of execution and further court hearings.
Id. See also Kenneth Woodward, Noonan's Life in the Law, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1,
1987, at 82.
65. Noonan, supra note 64, at 669. See also Sein Fagan, S.M., Interpreting
the Catechism, 44 DocrINE & LiFE 412, 416-17 (1994):
A catechism is supposed to "explain", but this one does not say
why Catholics have to take such a rigid, absolutist stand against
artificial contraception because it is papal teaching, but there is no
reference to the explicit centuries-long papal teaching that Jews and
heretics go to hell unless they convert to the Catholic faith, or to Pope
Leo X, who declared that the burning of heretics is in accord with the
will of the Holy Spirit. Six different popesjustified and authorised the
use of slavery. Pius XI, in an encyclical at least as important as Humane
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If the official Catholic position were still that slavery is per-
missible, the position would be what it once was: fundamentally
in error. If the official Catholic position were still that-and
here I quote Judge Noonan-"the duty of a good ruler was to
extirpate not only heresy but heretics""-the position would be
what it once was: fundamentally in error. "The vast institutional
apparatus of the Church was put at the service of detecting here-
tics, who, if they persevered in their heresy or relapsed into it,
would be executed at the stake. Hand and glove, Church and
State collaborated in the terror by which heretics were purged." 7
"Eventually," we are told, "the church came to tolerate religious
tolerance, but papal advisors continued to uphold state-enforced
orthodoxy as an ideal."' If state-enforced religious orthodoxy
were still the official Catholic ideal, the Church's position would
be what it once was: fundamentally in error.
Why doubt that among still-official Catholic propositions
and ideals, there are contemporary analogues of the proposition
about slavery, the proposition about the extirpation of heretics,
and the ideal of state-enforced religious orthodoxy? We dare not
believe that the tradition has at last been purified and there
remain no sinful, disfiguring propositions or ideals among still-
official Catholic propositions and ideals. History has not ended.
These three official positions of the Church seem to me funda-
mentally in error; indeed, the first and third positions seem to
me little more than prejudice masquerading as theology:
* Women may not-theologically may not-be
ordained as priests; they may not receive the sacrament of
Holy Orders.69
Vitae, insisted that co-education is erroneous and pernicious, indeed
against nature. The Catechism's presentation of natural law gives the
impression that specific moral precepts can be read off from physical
human nature, without any awareness of the fact that our very
understanding of "nature" and what is "natural" can be coloured by
our culture.
Id. Cf. John Honner, S.J., Science v. Religion (H): Some Possible Answers, COMMON-
wEAL, Sept. 23, 1994, at 14, 15 ("My own favorite example of ecclesiastical con-
servatism, coming from Australia as I do, occurred in the year 748, when Pope
Zacharius condemned the idea of the Antipodes (the notion of the earth hav-
ing opposite sides) and their human occupation as a perverse and iniquitous
doctrine.")
66. Noonan, supra note 64, at 667.
67. Id.
68. Steinfels, supra note 64, at 8.
69. "This judgment is to be definitively held by all the church's faithful."
John Paul II, Apostolic Letter on Ordination and Women, 24 ORGINS 49, 51 (1994).
Thus has John Paul II tried, futilely, to curtail debate in the Catholic Church
about whether there is any theological impediment to women receiving the
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* "Deliberately contracepted" sexual conduct is always
immoral; it is immoral without regard to any particularities of
context.
7 0
sacrament of Holy Orders. At least the Pope, pulled back by several "high-
ranking bishops who gathered at a special Vatican meeting" before the
apostolic letter was issued, stopped short of using the language of "infallibility".
See Tom Fox, Bishops Pull Pope Back from Brink, NAT'L CATH. Rpm., June 17,
1994, at 3. See also Peter Hebblewaite, A Search for Openings in the Absence of
'Infallible', NAT'L CATH. Rpm., June 17, 1994, at 10. For a statement of the
Catholic Church's official position on the theological impossibility of ordaining
women, see Liberia Editrice Vaticana, CATECHISM OF CATHOLIC CHURCH 394
(para. 1577) (United States Catholic Conference trans. 1994) [hereinafter
CATECHISM]. For a discussion of the Church's official position, see McBrien,
supra note 37, at 772-79. Cf. Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Introduction: Violence
Against Women, Concilium, 1994/1, at vii.
Recently, Canadian Archbishop Maurice Couture, has written:
We perceive among many religious a profound discomfort with
the anthropological approach underlying a number of more or less
official texts of the church. To take it to the extreme, it is as if women
are so different from men that they do not share the same human
naturel By insisting on the "specific vocation" of women, and on "the
wealth of feminine nature".., and on what constitutes their "personal
dignity" . . . , it sometimes seems to be an elegant way of keeping
women away from those roles traditionally reserved in the church to
men.
Maurice Couture R.S.V., Consecrated Women: Equality in the Church, 24 OIUGINS
358, 359 (1994). In a recent Time essay, Lance Morrow (who is a convert to
Catholicism) has written:
Despite my respect for the church and my contempt for some of the
overstimulated moral idiocy of the secular world, I think that in two
areas-I) contraception and 2) ordination and the role of women-
the church has gone needlessly, dangerously astray.....
Strange that the church's leaders, with their intellectual tools and
20 centuries' experience, would fall into what might be called the Fal-
lacy of Incidentals. Women are not ordained priests because Christ, in
human form, was a man and chose male apostles. But surely maleness
was incidental to the essence of Christ's teaching and importance.
Those who build cathedrals of principle, unassailable traditions,
around an unimportant or incidental distinction-one that is rooted
in custom of distant time and, interminably preserved, becomes essen-
tially inhuman-are doomed.
The continuing damage done to the Catholic Church by the
exclusion of women from the priesthood is hard to estimate. What is
lost by keeping women out of the full priestly life amounts to a tragedy
for the church. In that policy, a world of opportunity has been closed;
life that might have flourished, women's souls sharing in the heart of
the church, has been shut down.
Morrow, supra note 46, at 88.
70. For a statement of the Catholic Church's official position, see
CATECHISM, supra note 69, at 570 (para. 2370). For a discussion of the Church's
official position, see McBrien, supra note 37, at 982-92. For a discussion of Pope
Paul VI's encyclical on contraception, Humanae Vitae (1968), and especially of
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* A sexual bond between two persons of the same sex
is always sinful; in particular, the homosexual bond is sinful
even if it is embedded in and expressive of a lifelong monogamous
relationship of faithful love-indeed, even if it is a generative
matrix of such a relationship, of such love.
71
its effect on Roman Catholic moral theology, see MAHONEY, supra note 1, ch. 7.
A recent comment by Redemptorist Father Bernard Hiring on Pope John Paul
II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor is worth reporting here. (Hiring, about eighty
years old, is arguably the Catholic Church's preeminent moral theologian.)
Veritatis Splendor contains many beautiful things.. But almost all real
splendor is lost when it becomes evident that the whole document is
directed above all towards one goal: to endorse total assent and
submission to all utterances of the pope-and above all on one crucial
point: that the use of any artificial means for regulating birth is
intrinsically evil and sinful, without exception, even in circumstances
where contraception would be a lesser evil.
Bernard Hiring, A Distrust That Wounds, TABLET (London), .Oct. 16, 1993, at
1332.
71. For a statement of the Catholic Church's official position, see
CATECHISM, supra note 69, at 566 (para. 2357); see also id. (paras. 2358-59).
Pope John Paul II has recently reasserted the Church's official position on
homosexual conduct. See Alan Cowell, Pope Calls Gay Marriage Threat to Family,
N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at A5. See also The Homosexual Movement: A Response
by the Ramsey Colloquium, FIRsr THINGS, Mar. 1994, at 15. For a powerful
"counter-response" to the position of "the Ramsey colloquium," see the letter
from various members of the National Association of College and University
Chaplains, FIRST THINGS, Sept. 1994, at 2.
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., a member of the theology faculty at the
University of Notre Dame, has criticized the Church's official position, and has
offered a position I find much more sound. See McCoum~ic, supra note 31. See
also McBRIEN, supra note 37, at 993-97. (Father McBrien is also a member, and
former chair, of the theology faculty at the University of Notre Dame.) Some
contemporary Catholics have written sympathetically about the theological
possibility of "gay marriages". In addition to the essays by Margaret Farley (see
supra note 1) and Rosemary Ruether, (see supra note 57), see RICHARD WEsrLEY,
MoRLaTY AND ITS BEYOND 169-98 & 222-28 (1984); Sydney Callahan, Why I
Changed My Mind: Thinking About Gay Marriage, COMMONWEAL, Apr. 22, 1994, at
6; Daniel Maguire, The Morality of Homosexual Marriage, in A CHALLENGE TO
LovE: GAY AND LESBIAN CATHOLICS IN THE CHURCH, supra note 1, at 118.
According to Maguire, "The marital good of exclusive, committed, enduring,
generous, and faithful love is a human good. We have no moral right to
declare it off limits to persons whom God has made gay." Id. at 133. Westley
has concluded that:
[Homosexual] unions too might well be classified as 1) marriages; 2)
marriages in the Lord; and 3) sacramental marriages. At least, let us
Christians not too quickly rule out the possibility in principle of
homosexuals achieving such satisfying human relationships, even the
sacramental one.... [T] here is nothing at all in the requirements for
a "marriage in the Lord" or a "sacramental marriage" . . . that would
automatically disqualify homosexuals.
WEsrLEY, supra, at 227.
It is consoling that one finds so much good sense among many of the
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The claim that "faithful" Catholics once owed "religious assent"
to the disfiguring propositions about slavery, the extirpation of
heretics, or state-enforced religious orthodoxy-or that faithful
Catholics today owe religious assent to the contemporary ana-
logues of such propositions-presupposes a deeply problematic
ecclesiology.72 That, however, is an issue for another day."
Catholics who have recently written letters to Commonweal on the subject of
homosexuality. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 56 (commenting on Sydney Calla-
han's piece).
John Noonan's essay is quite relevant to the question' of the Catholic
Church's position on homosexuality, though in the essay Noonan is not
addressing that or any other contemporary issue in particular. (Noonan
addressed the issue' of homosexuality-and several other issues-in an earlier
essay. SeeJohn Noonan, Genital Good, 8 COMMUNIO 198, 212-21 (1981).) Con-
sider, for example; this passage:
Experience as such, taken as "raw experience," the mere participation
in this or that phenomenon, is... not the key. RaW experience carries
with it no evaluation. But experience, suffered or perceived in the light of
human nature and of the gospel, can be judged good or bad. It was the
experience of unfreedom, in the gospel's light, that made the contrary
shine clear.
Noonan, supra note 64, at 676 (emphasis added). See also Westley, supra note
29, at 31:
Forgotten is the old theological dictum that the "teaching" church can
only teach what the "believing" church believes. Having it the wrong
way around skews everything; it discounts the religious experience of
all us believers and allows the church to be the curator of all truth, so
that no more truth can get into the enterprise. But I believe that God
is revealing God's self to us all the time. We have to get our antennae
back up.
Id. What does the "believing" church believe, not only about homosexual con-
duct, but also about contraception? See supra note 43 and accompanying text
for a partial answer (beliefs of.American Catholic priests).
72. See Thomas Siaffer, Erastian and. Sectarian Arguments in Religiously
Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1859, 1862 n.13 (1993)
("Ecclesiology is the branch of theology that deals with what the Church
(ecclesia) should be.")
73. For a statement of the claim about "faithful" Catholics and "religious
assent", see Gerard V. Bradley, Grounds for Assent, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 9,1994,
at 29. On the difficult question of Catholic identity-of what it means for
someone or something (e.g., a university) to be "Catholic"-see James Provost
& Knut Waif, eds., Catholic Identity, CONCILIUM, 1994/5. Suffice it to say that the
matter of Catholic identity and religious assent is more difficult-more
complicated-than Bradley allows. See, e.g., Norbert Greinacher, Catholic
Identity in the Third Epoch of Church History, CONCILIUM, 1994/5, at 3. See also
Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, Dissent & Communion: You Can't Have One Without
the Other, COMMONwEAL Nov. 18, 1994, at 9. She writes:
If one doubts whether real communion implies dissent, imagine a
church where dissent had been rendered unthinkable, impermissible,
or inexpressible. Would such a church be likely to resemble the inter-
personal, vital, ever deepening, always outstretching encounter of
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(What is the intended, if implicit, antonym of "faithful" in the
claim that faithful Catholics owe religious assent to such proposi-
tions? "Faithless"?74 May I suggest that a more appropriate anto-
nym is that between "mindful" and "mindless"?75 )
May my children come to see such disfiguring theology and
morality for what it is. May they come to see through it. And
may my children learn what countless Catholics (and other
Christians) were never taught in the course of their spiritual for-
mation-what they were never taught either as children or even as
adults.
One cannot predict future changes; one can only follow
present light and in that light be morally certain that some
obligations will never alter. The great commandments of
love of God and of neighbor, the great principles ofjustice
and charity continue to govern all development. God is
unchanging, but the demands of the New Testament are
different from those of the Old, and while no other revela-
hearts and minds that is communion? Or would it be more likely to
resemble the bureaucracy of government, the conformity of a
corporation, the discipline of an army, or even the ideological
unanimity of a totalitarian political movement?
Id. at 11. Cf Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Two Letters and an Inference, AMERICA,
Aug. 27, 1994, at 15.
74. Or is the intended antonym "unfaithful"? (To be "faithless" is to be
without faith. To be "unfaithful" to someone or something is to be untrue to
someone or something.) On one way in which the Church itself can be
"unfaithful", see infra note 76.
75. There is a sense in which a "mindless" Catholicism is "unfaithful" to
the Catholic tradition. As David Hollenbach, SJ., has explained,
Faith and understanding go hand in hand in both the Catholic and
Calvinist views of the matter. They are not adversarial but reciprocally
illuminating. As [David] Tracy puts it, Catholic social thought seeks to
correlate arguments drawn from the distinctively religious symbols of
Christianity with arguments based on shared public experience. This
effort at correlation moves back and forth on a two-way street. It rests
on a conviction that the classic symbols of Christianity can uncover
meaning in personal and social existence that common sense and
uncontroversial science fail to see. So it invites those outside the
church to place their self-understanding at risk by what Tracy calls
conversation with such "classics."
David Hollenbach, SJ., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and
Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877, 894 (1993). Hollenbach then adds, follow-
ing Tracy: "At the same time, the believer's self-understanding is also placed at
risk because it can be challenged to development or even fundamental change
by dialogue with the other-whether this be a secular agnostic, a Christian
from another tradition, or a Jew, Muslim, or Buddhist." Id. at 894-95. I add,
with an eye on the issue that has engaged me here: Or whether this be a les-
bian or a gay man, perhaps even a Christian lesbian or a Christian gay man,
living in a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful love.
RESPONSE TO FINNIS
tion supplements the New, it is evident from the case of
slavery alone that it has taken time to ascertain what the
demands of the New really are. All will be judged by the
demands of the day in which they live. It is not within
human competence to say with certainty who was or will be
saved; all will be judged as they have conscientiously acted.
In new conditions, with new insight, an old rule need not
be preserved in order to honor a past discipline.
In the Church there can always be fresh appeal to
Christ, there is always the possibility of probing new depths
of insight. . . . Must we not, then, frankly admit that
change is something that plays a role in Catholic moral
teaching? ... Yes, if the principle of change is the person
of Christ.
7 6
76. Noonan, supra note 64, at 676-77. See also MAHoNEY, supra note 1, at
327 (emphasis added):
At any stage in history all that is available to the Church is its continual
meditation on the Word of God in the light of contemporary
experience and of the knowledge and insights into reality which it
possesses at the time. To be faithful to that set of circumstances... is
the charge and the challenge which Christ has given to his Church.
But if there is a historical shift, through improvement in scholarship
or knowledge, or through an entry of society into a significantly
different age, then what that same fidelity requires of the Church is
that it respond to the historical shift, such that it might be not only
mistaken but also unfaithful in declining to do so.
Id.
After I finished drafting this essay, I read in America an article by Richard L.
Smith, the conclusion to which-a true story-seems a fitting coda to this essay.
The devoutly Catholic mother of a young man in his late 20's was
devastated to learn that her son was dying of AIDS in San Francisco.
Over the years, she had tried to keep in touch with him, but, for rea-
sons she could not fully understand, he had become progressively
aloof from her. Now, with the news of his illness, she quickly travelled
from her home in the Midwest to see him, perhaps for the last time.
As is frequently the case, the news of her son's diagnosis was the
first inkling she had that her son was gay, and this realization com-
pounded her grief and sadness. Upon arriving at his San Francisco
home, she was greeted at the door by his lover, whom she had never
even heard about. He warmly welcomed her, took her coat, and led
her immediately to her son's bedroom.
She stayed several days at the bedside of her son, playing cards
and watching television with him, helping with *his care, talking to his
doctor. But despite her satisfaction in being able to share that time
with him, it was obvious that she remained disturbed about her son's
homosexuality. This was particularly apparent in the rigidity and cold-
ness with which she responded whenever his lover came into the
room.
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After a few days, she suggested to her son that it was time to call a
priest, and her son agreed. Shortly after arriving at the house, the
priest recognized the reason behind the mother's anxiety. After pray-
ing with her and her son, he stayed for a chat. He asked her about her
life in the Midwest. Eventually he asked her how she had come to
meet her husband, now deceased for several years. She began to remi-
nisce about the time they first met, the hat he was wearing, the cafe
where they went on their first date. She talked about the bittersweet
early years of their marriage, the financial struggles they endured and
the painful fact that her family had not accepted her husband, feeling
that he was somehow beneath them.
As the visit continued, the priest eventually turned to the young
man with AIDS. He asked him how he had come to meet his lover.
Slowly, the young man began to tell his story of how they met at a
party, where they went on their first dates, hiking trips they took and
their decision finally to establish a home together.
As his mother listened to her son, a subtle miracle began to
occur. She began to recognize some profound similarities in their two
stories. Despite the obvious differences between them, they both
seemed to be part of a universe more vast than she had previously
imagined. It was not so much that she began consciously to reformu-
late her ethical construction of her son's homosexuality. Nothing so
abstract as all that. Rather, she began to understand that her son had
simply but truly fallen in love with another man-just as she had once
fallen in love with her husband. How amazingl How wonderful!
Somehow, as she listened to her son speak about his lover, her
ethical categories and cultural boundaries, while still intact, seemed
much less important. What seemed far more significant was the won-
derful and amusing mystery of love and life that could hold both her
and her son, each with their own uniqueness.
The AIDS epidemic is a moment when the gay community and
the Catholic Church come together in the face of immense human
pain. We can hope that, without abdicating their respective identities
and values, these two cultures can nevertheless find here a common
ground on which to meet. In this tragic moment, may the structure of
war give way to the structure of dialogue. May extravagant compassion
be extended, profound truths be shared, rich stories be told and amaz-
ing discoveries be made about the vastness of love and life.
Richard L. Smith, Gays and the Bishops: Searching for Common Ground, AMERICA,
Sept. 24, 1994, at 12, 17.
